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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001). Direct appeal of the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration is taken pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-31a-129(l)(a) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the 2004 Amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 
should be applied retroactively. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in 
Plaintiff/Appellee Gloria Soriano's ("Plaintiff5) Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration [R. 21-41], Defendant/Appellant 
Elizabeth S. Graul, M.D.'s, (ccDr. Graul") Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Stay Litigation and Compel Arbitration [R. 45-57], and at the hearing 
on Dr. Graul's Motion to Stay Litigation and Compel Arbitration [R. 91]. 
Standard of Review: The issue of whether a statute can or should be applied 
retroactively is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. Goebel v. Salt Lalce City Southern R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, 11 39, 104 
Common, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997); Brown 8c Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. 
Common, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997)). 
PROVISIONS OF STATUTES AND RULES 
The interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-17 (2004), Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000), U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, cl. 1 and Utah Const. Art. I, § 18 
are of importance to this appeal, copies of which are attached hereto as Addenda A 
through D respectively. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
This is a medical malpractice case arising out of the care and treatment 
Plaintiff received from Dr. Graul in May of 2004. Prior to Plaintiff receiving 
medical care from Dr. Graul, Plaintiff and Dr. Graul entered into an Arbitration 
Agreement agreeing to arbitrate all claims related to the care and treatment 
provided by Dr. Graul. In response to Plaintiffs Complaint and prior to any other 
responsive pleadings being filed, Dr. Graul filed a Motion to Stay Litigation and 
Compel Arbitration ("Dr. GrauTs Motion53) which Plaintiff opposed. Dr. GrauTs 
Motion was heard on March 16, 2007, by the Honorable Kate Toomey. Judge 
Toomey entered an order on March 27, 2007, denying Dr. GrauTs Motion on the 
basis that the 2004 Amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 apply 
7 
retroactively rendering the Arbitration Agreement unenforceable. This appeal 
followed. 
Statement of Facts 
Dr. Graul is a obstetric/gynecologic physician licensed to practice medicine in 
the State of Utah. [R. 1]. On April 28, 2004, Plaintiff Gloria Soriano presented 
at Dr. GrauPs office and was evaluated for gynecologic complaints including an 
enlarged uterus. [R. 2]. On that same date, Ms. Soriano signed an Arbitration 
Agreement (the "Agreement35). [R. 16]. Article 1 of the Agreement provides that 
the parties: 
agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and 
claims for damages of any kind for injuries and losses 
arising from the medical care rendered . . . after the date 
of this agreement. All claims for monetary damages 
against any physician . . . must be arbitrated including, 
without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of 
consortium . . . emotional distress . . . . 
[R. 16]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 sets forth the requirements arbitration 
agreements between physician and their patients must meet in order to be valid and 
enforceable. [R. 23]. Section 78-14-17 was amended in 2004 (the "2004 
Amendments53) with the Amendments becoming effective on May 3, 2004. [R. 
24; 47]. 
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On May 10, 20045 Dr. Graul performed a vaginal hysterectomy and bilateral 
salpingo-oophorectomy on Ms. Soriano. [R. 2]. By Complaint dated September 
11, 2006, Ms. Soriano sued Dr. Graul alleging medical malpractice for injury 
allegedly arising out of Dr. GrauPs surgery of May 10, 2004, and related medical 
treatment. [R. 1-5]. On October 12, 2006, Dr. Graul filed her Motion requesting 
that the trial court compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. [R. 
12-14]. 
On November 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Opposition to 
Dr. GrauPs Motion arguing that the Agreement is unenforceable because it fails to 
comply with the requirements set forth in the 2004 Amendments. [R. 23-26]. In 
response, Dr. Graul asserted—and Plaintiff did not dispute—that the Agreement 
complies with the 2003 version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17, the version of the 
statute in effect at the time the Agreement was signed by Plaintiff. [R. 47]. 
Dr. Graul did not dispute Plaintiffs contention that the Agreement failed to 
comply with the 2004 Amendments. [R. 75]. Dr. Graul did, however, argue that 
the provisions of the 2004 Amendments do not apply retroactively to the 
Agreement. [R. 47-49]. 
Dr. GrauPs Motion was heard by the Honorable Kate Toomey on March 16, 
2007. [R. 91]. By Memorandum Decision dated March 27, 2007, Judge Toomey 
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denied Dr. GrauTs Motion on the basis that the 2004 Amendments are retroactive, 
and because the Agreement does not comply with the requirements set forth in the 
2004 Amendments, the Agreement is unenforceable. [R. 75]. Specifically, Judge 
Toomey concluded that the plain language of § 78-14-17 indicates that the 
Legislature intended for the 2004 Amendments to apply to all arbitration 
agreements executed after May 2, 1999. [R. 74]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The 2004 Amendments to § 78-14-17 should not be applied 
retroactively because the Legislature did not expressly declare that the 2004 
Amendments are to be applied retroactively. In Utah, there exists a strong 
presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. Consistent with this 
presumption, Utah statutory mandate and well-established Utah jurisprudence make 
clear that a statute cannot be given retroactive effect unless the Legislature expressly 
declares such an intent in the statute itself. Nowhere in the 2004 Amendments 
does the Legislature expressly declare that the 2004 Amendments are to be applied 
retroactively In the absence of an express declaration of retroactive application, the 
trial court's strained reading of § 78-14-17 violates the strong presumption against 
the retroactive application of statutes. 
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II. The 2004 Amendments affect the substantive rights and obligations 
of parties to physician/patient arbitration agreements and, thus, should not be 
applied retroactively. A statutory amendment that merely alters the procedure by 
which substantive rights are adjudicated can be retroactively applicable. On the 
other hand, if a statutory amendment changes the contractual rights and obligations 
of the parties, it is substantive and should not be applied retroactively. The 2004 
Amendments directly affect the contractual rights and obligations of Dr. Graul and 
Plaintiff—and indeed all parties to physician/patient arbitration agreements entered 
into prior to the Amendments taking effect—by rendering the Agreement 
unenforceable. Thus, the 2004 Amendments are substantive and should not be 
applied retroactively. 
HE. Retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments violates the contract 
clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions. It is a well-established rule of 
statutory construction that if a legislative act is susceptible of two constructions, 
one conformable to the constitutional provision on the subject, and the other not, 
the Court should adopt the one that is conformable, and reject the other that is 
not. A violation of the contract clause will be found when the application of a new 
statute to an existing contract changes the meaning of the contract and deprives 
parties of a contractual right which they would have had under the prior statutory 
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scheme. The trial court's retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments violates 
the contract clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions because it changes 
the meaning of the Agreement and deprives Dr. Graul of her right to compel 
Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims, a right that Dr. Graul would have had under the 
2003 version of § 78-14-17. Accordingly this Court should confirm the 
constitutionality of § 78-14-17 by rejecting the retroactive application of the 2004 
Amendments. 
IV The trial court's failure to give meaning to all of the provisions of 
Subsection (1) of § 78-14-17 renders its conclusion that the 2004 Amendments 
apply retroactively incorrect. The language of Subsection (1) provides two 
alternatives regarding the application of the statute's requirements: 1) apply the 
requirements of Subsection (1) to all newly executed agreements; or 2) apply any 
new requirements in Subsection (1) (Le.^ following any amendments) to a renewed 
agreement that previously met the requirements of Subsection (1) on at least one 
occasion. In ignoring the language in Subsection (1) that provides for these 
alternatives, the trial court incorrectly determined that the 2004 Amendments apply 
retroactively to all physician/patient arbitration agreements validly executed under 
prior versions of § 78-14-17. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE 2004 AMENDMENTS SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED 
RETROACTIVELY BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT 
EXPRESSLY DECLARE THEM TO BE RETROACTIVE. 
It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that retroactive application of 
new statutes is usually unfair. 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 41:2 (6th 
ed.). Indeed, ccthe hackneyed maxim that everyone is held to know the law, itself a 
principle of dubious wisdom, nevertheless presupposes that the law is at least 
susceptible of being known. But this is not possible concerning a law that has yet 
to exist.53 LdL Accordingly the Utah Supreme Court has made clear that as a 
general rule, "[retroactivity is not favored in the law." Goebel v. Salt Lake City 
Southern R.R. Co.. 2004 UT 80, 11 39, 104 P.3d 1185 (citing Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp.. 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)). 
Consistent with these principles, both the Utah Legislature and Judiciary 
recognize a strong presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. 
Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12, 11 30, 84 P.3d 1201 (j. 
Durham concurring). The Utah Legislature expressly codified this presumption by 
clearly stating cc[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared.35 Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000). Reinforcing this legislative mandate 
is the well-established Utah jurisprudence that a statute cannot be given retroactive 
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effect unless the legislature expressly declares such an intent in the statute itself. 
Goebel, 2004 UT at It 39 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000)); see also 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988); Stephens v. Henderson, 741 
P.2d952, 953 (Utah 1987). 
In the instant case, the trial court incorrectly held that the 2004 
Amendments apply retroactively because the Legislature did not expressly declare 
that the 2004 Amendments are to be applied retroactively. The provisions of 
§ 78-14-17 cited by trial court in reaching its decision are: 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration 
agreement between a patient and a health care provider to 
be validly executed, or, if the requirements of this 
Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least 
one occasion, renewed . . . 
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a 
claim governed by a binding arbitration agreement that 
was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(1) and (5) (2004). 
Upon an analysis of these provisions, the trial court specifically reasoned 
that: 
[t]he plain language of § 78-14-17 indicates that the 
Legislature intended for the amended requirements of 
Subsection (1) to apply to all arbitration agreements 
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executed cc[a]fter May 2, 1999 " Notably the 
language cc[a]fter May 2, 1999" has appeared in the 
statute since it was enacted on May 3, 1999. By 
preserving this language in the 2004 amendment to the 
statute, the Legislature evidenced its intent to apply the 
amendment retroactively 
Likewise, Subsection (5) indicates that cc[t]he 
requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim 
governed by a binding arbitration agreement that was 
executed or renewed before May 3, 1999." This 
language reinforces the notion that the Legislature 
intended to apply the amended requirements of 
Subsection (1) only to arbitration agreements executed 
after May 2, 1999. Otherwise, the Legislature would 
have modified Subsection (5) in 2004 to indicate that the 
amendments apply only prospectively from the date of 
the amendment. Accordingly, the Court determines that 
the 2004 amendment to § 78-14-17 applies retroactively. 
[R. 74-75]. 
A review of the trial court's reasoning reveals that it never specifically 
identified where in the statute that the Legislature expressly declared the 2004 
Amendments to be retroactive. That is because no such express declaration exists 
in § 78-14-17. Instead, the court engages in a strained reading of the statute to 
arrive at its conclusion. The trial court's use of the language "indicates that the 
Legislature intended53 and "the Legislature evidenced its intent" reveals the 
derivative nature of the trial court's reasoning. The court is required to piece 
together the Legislature's intent from various subsections of the statute to apply it 
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retroactively because the statute lacks a clear and express declaration by the 
Legislature that it is to be applied retroactively. 
The Utah Legislature knows how to expressly declare that a statute is to be 
applied retroactively and it did not do so in § 78-14-17. For example, under the 
Environmental Quality Code, the Legislature expressly stated: 
(3)(a) It is the intent of the Legislature that liability as 
determined under this act applies retroactively to any 
release of a hazardous substance or material subject to or 
currently in the process of investigation, abatement, or 
corrective action under this part as of the effective date of 
this act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-302.5 (1995) (emphasis added). In addition, in the Utah 
Code of Criminal Procedure, the Legislature expressly stated: cc[t]he provisions of 
Sections 77-18-9 through 77-18-17 apply retroactively to all arrests and convictions 
regardless of the date on which the arrests were made or convictions entered.35 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-17 (1994) (emphasis added). A plain reading of § 78-
14-17 reveals that the statute is void of any similar language expressly declaring the 
Legislature's intent to apply 2004 Amendments retroactively. 
In the absence of an express declaration of retroactive application, the trial 
court's strained reading of § 78-14-17 violates the strong presumption against the 
11 
retroactive application of statutes. The trial court should be reversed for this reason 
alone. 
II. THE 2004 AMENDMENTS SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED 
RETROACTIVELY BECAUSE THEY AFFECT THE 
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF PARTIES TO PHYSICIAN-PATIENT 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS. 
One exception to the strong presumption against the retroactive application 
of statutes is the "procedural53 exception. Thomas, 2004 UT at 11 33. Under this 
exception, a statutory amendment that merely alters the procedure by which 
substantive rights are adjudicated, is retroactively applicable. I d An amendment is 
merely procedural if it "does not 'enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or 
contractual rights.555 Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(quoting Salt Lake Child &: Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 
1017, 1020 (Utah 1995)). On the other hand, cc[i]f a statutory amendment 
changes the contractual rights and obligations of the parties, it is substantive.55 
Washington Nat5! Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (citing Petty v. Clark, 192 P2d 589, 593 (Utah 1948). Further, cc[e]very 
amendment not expressly characterized as a clarification [of existing law] carries the 
rebuttable presumption that it is intended to change existing legal rights and 
liabilities.55 State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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The 2004 Amendments affect the substantive rights and obligations of 
Dr. Graul and Plaintiff and, thus, should not be applied retroactively. As 
established in Section I. above, the Legislature did not expressly declare the 2004 
Amendments to be retroactive. See § I. supra. Nor did the Legislature expressly 
characterize the 2004 Amendments as a clarification of existing law. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2004). As a result, the 2004 Amendments are presumed 
to be substantive and should not be applied retroactively. Amador, 804 P.2d at 
1234. 
In addition, the trial court's decision in the instant case clearly demonstrates 
the substantive nature of the 2004 Amendments. The trial court concluded that 
because the Agreement does not comply with the requirements set forth in the 
2004 Amendments, the Agreement is unenforceable. [R. 75]. The obvious result 
of the retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments is to eliminate Dr. GrauPs 
contractual right to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her medical malpractice claims, and 
Plaintiffs corresponding contractual obligation to arbitrate her claims. [R. 71-76]. 
Thus, the trial court's own decision makes clear that the 2004 Amendments are 
substantive because when applied retroactively, they "change the contractual rights 
and obligations of the parties.35 Washington Natl Ins. Co., 795 P.2d at 667. 
Not only does the retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments affect 
Dr. GrauTs and Plaintiffs contractual rights and obligations, it affects the rights of 
all parties to physician/patient arbitration agreements entered into prior to May 3, 
2004. Indeed, the retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments will directiy 
interfere with the contractual rights of parties to hundreds, if not thousands, of 
physician/patient arbitration agreements. This result is untenable under the Utah 
and United States Constitutions. 
III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 2004 AMENDMENTS 
VIOLATES THE CONTRACT CLAUSES OF THE UTAH AND 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that ccif a legislative act is 
susceptible of two constructions, one conformable to the constitutional provision 
on the subject, and the other not, [the Court] will adopt the one that is 
conformable, and reject the other that is not. Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, 11 
42, —P.3d— (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Holman, 202 P. 1096, 1098 (Utah 
1921)). Further, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that ccwe have a duty to 
construe a statute whenever possible so as to effectuate legislative intent and avoid 
and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities.35 State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 
390, 397 (Utah 1989). 
The contract clause of the Utah State Constitution provides: 
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[n]o bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing 
the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 18. The contract clause of the United States Constitution 
similarly provides: 
[n]o state shall . . . pass any bill of attainder, as ex post 
facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, 
or grant any tide of nobility. 
U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
In giving meaning to the contract clause, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that: 
[i]t has long been recognized that the "impairment of 
obligation33 provision of the United States Constitution 
(and similarly that of Utah's Constitution) is not to 
protect future contracts but rather those existing prior to 
the enactment of the challenged statute. These provisions 
do not establish a right of parties to make contracts that 
are illegal and against public policy. They merely prevent 
"impairment55 by a changing of the laws after the contract 
has been made. 
Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Industrial Common, 583 P.2d 53, 60 (Utah 
1978) (emphasis added). A violation of the contract clause will be found when the 
application of a new statute to an existing contract "changes the meaning of [the] 
contract and deprives [defendants] of a contractual right which [they] would have 
had under the prior statutory scheme." Washington Natl Ins. Co. v. Sherwood 
i s 
Associates, 795 P.2d 665, 670 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Fundamentally, "a later 
statute or amendment should not be applied in a retroactive manner to deprive a 
party of his rights or impose greater liability upon him.53 Oakland Constr. Co. v. 
Industrial Common. 520 P.2d 208, 210 (Utah 1974). 
The retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments violates the contract 
clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions by substantially 
impairing—indeed invalidating—existing physician/patient arbitration validly 
executed under prior versions of § 78-14-17. As established in Section III. supra, 
the trial court's retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments to the Agreement 
fundamentally changes the contractual rights and obligations of Dr. Graul and 
Plaintiff. See § III. supra. Plainly, the trial court's decision changes the meaning 
of the Agreement and deprives Dr. Graul of her right to compel Plaintiff to 
arbitrate her claims, a right that Dr. Graul would have had under the 2003 version 
of § 78-14-17. See Washington Naf 1 Ins. Co., 795 P.2d at 670. 
In addition to affecting the contractual rights of the parties to the instant 
appeal, the consequences of the retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments 
are far reaching. Hundreds, if not thousands, of physician/patient arbitration 
agreements have been entered into since May 2, 1999 and prior to May 3, 2004. 
Many, if not all of these agreements were made to conform with the prior versions 
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of § 78-14-17 in an effort to render them valid and enforceable. Because the 2004 
Amendments change the requirements these agreements must meet in order to be 
enforceable, retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments will, like in the 
instant case, render all of these agreement unenforceable. This result is simply 
unacceptable under the contract clauses of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. Accordingly, this Court should confirm the constitutionality of 
§ 78-14-17 by rejecting the retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments. 
TV. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE MEANING TO ALL OF 
THE PROVISIONS OF § 78-14-17 RENDERING ITS 
CONCLUSION THAT THE 2004 AMENDMENTS ARE 
RETROACTIVE INCORRECT. 
This Court has consistentiy recognized that "the best evidence of the 
legislature's intent and purpose [in enacting statutes] is the plain language of the 
statute.55 Eastern Utah Broadcasting and Worker's Compensation Fund v. Labor 
Comm5n, 2007 UT App 99, 11 8, 158 P.3d 1115. Further, "the well-established 
principle of statutory construction requires [the Court] to give meaning, where 
possible, to all provisions of a statute.55 Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 23, 11 
P.3d277. 
In reaching its conclusion, the trial court violated these fundamental tenets of 
statutory construction by failing to give meaning to all provisions of the statute. 
17 
Indeed, the trial court ignored the plain and significant language in Subsection (1) 
of § 78-14-17 that indicates the Legislature's intent to not apply the 2004 
Amendments retroactively The trial court concluded that the following language 
in Subsection (1) of § 78-14-17 is evidence of the Legislature's intent to apply the 
statute retroactively: 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration 
agreement between a patient and a health care provider to 
be validly executed, or, if the requirements of this 
Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least 
one occasion, renewed . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(1) (2004). The trial court reasoned that "by 
preserving the language c[a]fter May 2, 1999' in the 2004 Amendments, the 
Legislature evidenced its intent to apply the amendment retroactively" [R. 74]. 
Notably, the second portion of the first sentence in Subsection (1) is simply 
missing from the trial court's analysis. The trial court ignored the language: "or, if 
the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least 
one occasion, renewed . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(1) (2004) (emphasis 
added). The trial court's failure to give meaning to this language not only violates 
fundamental principles of statutory construction, it renders the court's 
interpretation of the statute incorrect. 
18 
The word ccor55 is inherentiy disjunctive and is typically "used to link 
alternatives.55 Oxford English Dictionary, (rev. 10th ed. 2002). The presence of the 
word ccor55 in the first sentence of Subsection (1) reveals the disjunctive nature of 
the provision, and that the Subsection provides two alternatives regarding the 
application of the statute's requirements: 1) apply the requirements of Subsection 
(1) to all newly executed agreements; or 2) apply any new requirements in 
Subsection (1) (i.e., following any amendments) to a renewed agreement that 
previously met the requirements of Subsection (1) on at least one occasion. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(1) (2004). In other words, all arbitration agreements 
entered into after May 2, 1999, must meet the present requirements (2004 
Amendments) of Subsection (1), unless the physician-patient arbitration agreement 
previously met the requirements of Subsection (1) under a previous version of the 
statute. See id 
The facts of the instant case illustrate the application of the second alternative 
in Subsection (1), and the inaccuracy of the trial court's conclusion that the 2004 
Amendments are retroactive. In the instant case, neither Plaintiff, nor the trial 
court, disputes the fact that the Agreement complies with the requirements set 
forth in the 2003 version of § 78-14-17. [R. 47; 71-77]. As a result, the 
Agreement met the requirements of Subsection (1) on at least one occasion: when 
1Q 
it was executed by the parties in April of 2003 prior to the 2004 Amendments 
taking effect. 
[R. 47]. Thus, the Agreement falls under the second alternative of 
Subsection (1) rendering it valid and enforceable until the Agreement was to be 
renewed. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(1) (2004). Moreover, because Plaintiff 
did not seek any further treatment from Dr. Graul beyond the May 10, 2003 
surgery there was no need, or opportunity to renew the Agreement and bring it 
into compliance with the 2004 Amendments. [R. 91, pp. 14-16]. Therefore, the 
Agreement is valid and enforceable because it met the requirements of Subsection 
(1) under the 2003 version of the statute, the version of the statute that was in 
effect at the time the Agreement was executed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Graul respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court and hold that the 2004 Amendments to § 78-14-17 should 
not be applied retroactively. 
20 
Respectfully submitted this <)•> ) day of August, 2007. 
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Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant Elizabeth S. Graul, M.D. 
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ADDENDUM A 
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(2004)) 
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78-14-12. Division to provide panel — Exemption — Pro-
cedures — Statute of limitations tolled — Com-
position of panel — Expenses — Division autho-
rized to set license fees. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Application of savings provision. 
Prerequisite to filing complaint. 
—Prelitigation panel review. 
Tolling of limitation period. 
—Federal claims. 
Application of savings provision. 
Filing of complaint within the limitations 
period of this chapter commenced an action 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 3, so that parties' error in 
failing to comply with the required prelitigation 
procedures did not prevent them from starting 
anew under the savings provision, § 78-12-40, 
granting a one-year extension of the filing time 
after dismissal for noncompliance with the pre-
litigation procedures. McBride-Williams v. 
Huard, 2004 UT 21, 494 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 94 
P.3d 175. 
Dismissal of a case for failure to satisfy the 
prelitigation requirements of this chapter did 
not prevent application of the savings provision 
of § 78-12-40, which allowed the plaintiff to 
commence a new action within one year after 
the failure of his original action. (Unpublished 
decision.) Cline v. Associated Clinical & Coun-
seling Psychologists, 2005 UT App 15. 
Prerequisite to filing complaint. 
—Prelitigation panel review. 
Because mailing the request for prelitigation 
panel review is not part of the proceedings, as 
that term is used in this section, failure to 
comply with the mailing requirement does not 
affect the district court's subject matter juris-
diction. Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 
UT 15, 493 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 89 P.3d 113. 
Summary judgment was properly granted in 
favor of defendant medical center as the plain-
tiff did not bring his claim before a prelitigation 
panel review. Smith v. Four Corners Mental 
Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, 473 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 50, 70 P.3d 904. 
Tolling of limitation period. 
—Federal claims. 
In actions under the federal Emergency Med-
ical Treatment and Liability Act (EMTALA), 42 
USCS § 1395dd, because a potential direct 
conflict exists between the pre-litigation claim 
screening requirements of this section and 
EMTALA's statute of limitations, EMTALApre-
empts state law on this point. As a result, the 
pre-litigation screening requirements and de-
layed-discovery provisions are not "incorpo-
rated" into EMTALA and do not toll EMTALA's 
two-year limitations period. Merce v. Green-
wood, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah 2004). 
78-14-17. Arbitration agreements. 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a 
patient and a health care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements 
of this Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least one occasion, 
renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following information on: 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead 
of having the claim heard by a judge or jury; 
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators 
are selected under the agreement; 
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs 
under the agreement; 
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement 
and still receive health care if Subsection (3) applies; 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the 
agreement is canceled in writing before the renewal date; 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration 
agreement answered; 
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(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within ten 
days of signing the agreement; and 
(viii) the right of the patient to require mediation of the > dispute 
prior to the arbitration of the dispute; 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(i) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b)(ii), a panel of three 
arbitrators shall be selected as follows: 
(A) one arbitrator collectively selected by all persons claiming 
damages; 
(B) one arbitrator selected by the health care provider; and 
(C) a third arbitrator: 
(I) jointly selected by all persons claiming damages and 
the health care provider; or 
(II) if both parties cannot agree on the selection of the 
third arbitrator, the other two arbitrators shall appoint the 
third arbitrator from a list of individual approved as arbi-
trators by the state or federal courts of Utah; or 
(ii) if both parties agree, a single arbitrator may be selected; 
(iii) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78-14-12 to appear 
before a hearing panel in a malpractice action against a health care 
provider; 
(iv) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within 
ten days of signing the agreement; 
(v) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the 
agreement be automatically renewed each year unless the agreement 
is canceled in writing by the patient or health care provider before the 
renewal date; 
(vi) the patient has the right to retain legal counsel; 
(vii) the agreement only apply to: 
(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement was 
signed, provided that the agreement may allow a person who 
would be a proper party in court to participate in an arbitration 
proceeding; 
(B) the claim of: 
(I) a person who signed the agreement; 
(II) a;person on whose behalf the agreement was signed 
under ^Subsection (6); and 
(III)| the unborn child of the person described in this 
Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B), for 12 months from the date the 
agreement is signed; and 
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract if 
the sole basis for the claim is an injury sustained by a person 
described in Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B); and 
(c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to: 
(i) read the written information required by Subsection (l)(a) and 
the arbitration agreement; and 
(ii) ask any questions. 
(2) When a medical malpractice action is arbitrated, the action shall: 
(a) be subject to Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act; and 
(b) include any one or more of the following when requested by the 
patient before an arbitration hearing is commenced: 
(i) mandatory mediation; 
(ii) retention of the jointly selected arbitrator for both the liability 
and damages stages of an arbitration proceeding if the arbitration is 
bifurcated; and 
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(iii) the filing of the panel's award of damages as a judgement 
against the provider in the appropriate district court, 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care 
on the sole basis that the patient or a person described in Subsection (6) 
refused to enter into a binding arbitration agreement with a health care 
provider. 
(4) A written acknowledgment of having received a written explanation of a 
binding arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a 
defense to a claim that the patient did not receive a written explanation of the 
agreement as required by Subsection (1) unless the patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the 
capacity to do so; or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the 
agreement was induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts of 
fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material 
facts. 
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by 
a binding arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 
1999. 
(6) Alegal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78-14-5(4), except a 
person temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding 
arbitration agreement on behalf of a patient. 
(7)^  This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject 
to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-17, enacted by L. 
1999, ch. 278, § 1; 2003, ch. 207, § 3; 2004, 
ch. 83, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 2003, added "if Subsec-
tion (2) applies" at the end of Subsection 
(l)(a)(iv); added Subsection (l)(a)(vii); and in-
serted "from the emergency department of a 
general acute hospital, as defined in Section 
26-21-2" in Subsection (2). 
The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, 
added Subsection (l)(a)(viii), the introductory 
clause in Subsection (l)(b)(i), and Subsections 
(l)(b)(ii) and (l)(b)(vi) to (2), making stylistic 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Legislative 
Developments — Medical Malpractice Amend-
ments, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 325. 
and related changes; deleted "and by verbal 
explanation" after "in writing" in Subsection 
(l)(a); substituted "ten days" for "3Q days" in 
Subsections (l)(a)(vh) and (l)(b)(iv); added the 
language beginning "if both parties" and ending 
"third arbitrator" in Subsection (l)(b)(i)(C)(II); 
deleted "of any kind from the emergency de-
partment of a general acute hospital, as defined 
in Section 26-21-2" after "denied health care" in 
Subsection (3ff and deleted "and verbal" before 
"explanation" twice in the introductory clause 
in Subsection (4). 
Sunset. — See Section 63-55-278 for the 
repeal date of this section. 
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ADDENDUM B 
(Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3(2000)) 
CONSTRUCTION 68-3-3 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 350. 
§§ 101, 190 et seq. 
68-3-3. Retroactive effect. 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2490/ means Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. See 
C.L. 1917, § 5840; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 88- § 68-2-1 and notes thereto. 
2-3, Cross-References. — Ex post facto law or 
Meaning of "these revised statutes.* — law impairing obligation of contract prohibited, 
The term "these revised statutes" apparently Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 18. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Application to particular areas of law. 
Construction and apphcation. 
Contingent fee agreement. 
Cited. 
Application to particular areas of law. 
See Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 
2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958) (corporations); 
People v. Clayton, 5 Utah 598,18 P. 628 (1888) 
(fees); In re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 
148 R2d 340 (1944) (inheritance tax); Stephens 
v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987) (joint 
and several liability); Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 
205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948) (pending actions); In 
re Anthony, 71 Utah 501, 267 P. 789 (1928) 
(pensions); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy 
Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P2d 1017 (Utah 
1995) (privileged communications); First Sec. 
Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992) 
(recorded documents); Industrial Comm'n v. 
Agee, 56 Utah 63, 189 P. 414 (1911) (worker's 
compensation); Silver King Coalition Mines Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Utah 2d 1,268 P.2d 689 
(1954) (worker's compensation). 
Construction and application. 
This section is merely a statement of well-
settled rules of statutory construction. Farrel v. 
Pingree, 5 Utah 443, 16 P. 843 (1888). 
This section is largely declaratory of pre-
existing rules of statutory construction. Mercur 
Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 
52 P. 382 (1898). 
In seeking to arrive at legislative intent, 
statutes should be construed in light of existing 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — 
Comment, The Liabihty Reform Act: An 
Approach to Equitable Application, 13 J. 
Contemp. L. 89 (1987). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur, 2d Statutes 
§§ 244 to 248. 
circumstances. Industrial Comm'n v. Agee, 56 
Utah 63, 189 P 414 (1911). 
This rule of construction has been recognized 
and adopted by the federal courts. Kansas City 
Life Ins. Co. v. Bowns, 129 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 
1942). 
The required inquiry is whether, in the ab-
stract, a new law affects the amount of punish-
ment an existing law can impose, as opposed to 
whether a new law affects the likelihood that a 
particular defendant will be sentenced to the 
greater of possible alternative punishments. 
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, 40 P.3d 611. 
Contingent fee agreement. 
The State Tax Commission's retroactive ap-
plication of § 59-2-703(2)(c) was erroneous be-
cause that section contains no language reflect-
ing an intent that the subsection should apply 
retroactively, and this section requires that it 
must be clear that the legislature intended the 
statute to operate retrospectively. Cache 
County v. State Tax Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758 
(Utah 1996). 
Cited in Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 
(Utah 1988); State v. Lavoto, 776 P.2d 912 
(Utah 1989); Worthington & Kimball Constr. 
Co. v. C & ADev. Co., 777 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989); 
Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); Rees v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc., 808 R2d 1069 
(Utah 1991); Stillman v. Teachers Ins. & 
Annuity Ass'n College Ret. Equities Fund, 343 
F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2003); State v. Marshall, 
2003 UT App 381, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 81 
P.3d 775. 
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 407 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Retrospective operation of state 
statutes or rules of court conferring in perso-
nam jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign 
corporations on the basis of isolated acts or 
transactions, 19 A.L.R.3d 138. 
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ADDENDUM C 
(U.S. Constitution, Article I § 10) 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. [Legislative Department]. 
II. [Executive Department]. 
III. [Judicial Department]. 
IV. [State And Territorial Relations]. 
V. [Amendment]. 
VI. [Miscellaneous Provisions]. 
VII. [Adoption]. 
Amendments 
© 2007 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the 
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
ARTICLE I 
[Legislative Department] 
Section 
1. [Legislative powers vested in Congress.] 
2. [House of Representatives.] 
3. [Senate.] 
4. [Election of members - Sessions.] 
5. [Organization - Proceedings - Adjournment.] 
6. [Compensation - Privileges - Holding other office.] 
7. [Bills and resolutions - Veto.] 
8. [Powers of Congress.] 
9. [Powers denied Congress.] 
10. [Powers denied the states.] 
© 2007 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the 
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Sec. 10. [Powers denied the states.] 
[1.] No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and 
reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in 
payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, as post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of 
contracts, or grant any title of nobility. 
[2.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or 
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net 
Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use 
of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and 
Control of the Congress. 
[3.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, 
or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreements or Compact with another State, or 
with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as 
will not admit of delay. 
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ADDENDUM D 
(Utah Constitution, Article I § 18) 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. Declaration of Rights. 
II. State Boundaries. 
III. Ordinance. 
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage. 
V. Distribution of Powers. 
VI. Legislative Department. 
VII. Executive Department. 
VIII. Judicial Department. 
IX. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment. 
X. Education. 
XL Local Governments. 
XII. Corporations. 
XIII. Revenue and Taxation. 
XIV. Public Debt. 
XV. Militia. 
XVI. Labor. 
XVII. Water Rights. 
XVIII. Forestry. 
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions. 
XX. Public Lands. 
XXI. Salaries. 
XXII. Miscellaneous. 
XXIII. Amendment and Revision. 
XXIV. Schedule. 
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ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines - Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment - Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance of warrant.] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press - Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt - Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free - Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder - Ex post facto laws - Impairing contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined - Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
29. [Marriage.] 
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Sec. 18. [Attainder - Ex post facto laws - Impairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be 
passed. 
History: Const. 1896. 
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